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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Fairchild appeals from the district court's denial of his motion for a new
trial.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The state charged

Fairchild with Grand Theft.

(R., pp.

90-91.)

Approximately five months before trial the state served Fairchild with a proposed
Amended Information. (4/9/13 Tr., p. 78, L. 18 - p. 82, L. 6.) The Amended
Information also charged Grand Theft and but added "with the intent to deprive
another of property" language.

(R., pp. 90-91, 121-122.) Two months before

trial, the state filed and served proposed jury instructions, which reflected the
Amended Information. (R., pp. 107-109; 4/9/13 Tr., p. 78, L. 18 - p. 82, L. 6.)
During jury selection the parties agreed to exercise their preemptory
challenges out of the presence of the jury and in chambers. (4/9/13 Tr., p. 68, L.
23 - p. 69, L. 15.) Fairchild waived his appearance as it related to the exercise
of preemptory challenges. (Id.) After the exercise of peremptory challenges the
district court asked both counsel about the order of jury instructions. (4/9/13 Tr.,
p. 72, L. 12 - p. 73, L. 2.) Fairchild's counsel stated he did not have anything to
add regarding the order of the jury instructions, but asked to make a record
regarding the jury instructions.
granted his request.

(Id.)

(4/9/13 Tr., p. 73, Ls. 3-8.) The district court

During the discussion regarding jury instructions,

Fairchild's counsel objected to the charging instruction because it contained the
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language of the Amended Information and the Amended Information was not
filed. (4/9/13 Tr., p. 75, L. 8 - p. 78, L. 23.) The state responded by moving to
amend the Information. (4/9/13 Tr., p. 79, L. 1 - p. 80, L. 2.) The state pointed
out that it provided the Amended Information and proposed Jury Instructions to
the defense months prior to trial and under Idaho Criminal Rule 7, the state is
allowed to amended the Information. (Id.) Fairchild's counsel admitted that he
had been provided the Amended Information and he was not surprised by the
amendment.

(4/9/13 Tr., p. 81, Ls. 5-20.)

The district court found that the

defendant's substantial rights were not prejudiced and found that the Amended
Information did not charge an additional or different offense. (4/9/13 Tr., p. 81,

L. 21 - p. 82, L. 8.) The district court allowed the amendment. (Id.) After the
district court granted the motion to amend, Fairchild's counsel did not object to
the proposed charging instruction. (Tr., p. 82, Ls. 15-17.)
The state also moved to dismiss Part 2 of the Information, the habitual
offender count. (4/9/13 Tr., p. 79, Ls. 1-3.) Fairchild's counsel did not object.
(Tr., p. 82, Ls. 9-12.) The parties then left chambers and conducted the trial.
(Tr., p. 82, L. 24 - p. 84, L. 5.)
The jury found Fairchild guilty of Grand Theft. (R., p. 211.) Fairchild filed
a Motion for New Trial on the grounds that the motion to amend was held in
chambers. (R., pp. 234-241.) After a hearing, the district court denied Fairchild's
motion for a new trial. (R., pp. 263-268.) The district court recognized that it was
a decision within its discretion and ruled:
The amendment would have been made either with or
without the defendant being present. Nor would the defendant
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have been able to testify at the time of the hearing on the
amendment because it is an issue of law. It does not appear in
looking back at the trial that Mr. Fairchild's rights were violated as it
relates to the ability to understand the charge, the ability to present
evidence, and, in fact, evidence was presented on his defense in
all particulars. There were a number of witnesses that testified on
his behalf.
(9/10/13 Tr., p. 26, Ls. 14-23.) The district court sentenced Fairchild to eight
years with three years fixed. (R., pp. 273-275.) Fairchild timely appealed. (R.,
pp. 286-287.)
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ISSUE
Fairchild states the issues on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Fairchild's motion for a
new trial?
(Appellant's brief, p. 4)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Fairchild failed to show the district court abused its discretion when it
denied his motion for a new trial?
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ARGUMENT
Fairchild Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It
Denied His Motion For A New Trial
A.

Introduction
Fairchild argues the district court abused its discretion by denying his

motion for new trial.

(Appellant's brief, p. 5.)

Fairchild moved for a new trial

because he claimed his right to a public trial and right to be present were violated
when the district court held a motion hearing in chambers. (Appellant's brief, pp.
5-8.) Fairchild's claims are not grounds for a new trial under Idaho Code§ 192406, and his rights to a public trial and right to be present were not violated.
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied his motion for a new
trial.

B.

Standard Of Review
A decision on a motion for new trial is reviewed under an abuse of

discretion standard. State v. Egersdorf, 126 Idaho 684, 687, 889 P.2d 118, 121
(Ct. App. 1995).

When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on

appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1)
whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it;
and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). A trial court
has wide discretion to grant or refuse to grant a new trial, and on appeal the
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appellate courts will not disturb that exercise of discretion absent a showing of
manifest abuse. State v. Butcher, 137 Idaho 125, 135, 44 P.3d 1180, 1190 (Ct.
App. 2002) (citing State v. Olin. 103 Idaho 391, 648 P.2d 203 (1982)).

C.

Fairchild Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It
Denied His Motion For A New Trial
Fairchild argues that he was entitled to a new trial because "the

amendment of the information following jury selection, was held without his
presence and in chambers." (Appellant's brief, p. 5.) "[Idaho Criminal Rule] 34
grants a trial court discretion to order a new trial 'if required in the interest of
justice,' but 'I.C. § 19-2406 sets forth the only grounds permitting the grant of a
new trial and, therefore, limits the instances in which the trial courts discretion
may be exercised."' State v. Ellington, 157 Idaho 480, _, 337 P.3d 639, 644
(2014) (citing State v. Cantu, 129 Idaho 673,675,931 P.2d 1191, 1193 (1997)).
Fairchild argues that his claim for a new trial falls under subsections (1) and (5)
of Idaho Code§ 19-2406. (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-6.):
When a verdict has been rendered against the defendant the court
may, upon his application, grant a new trial in the following cases
only:
1. When the trial has been had in his absence, if the
indictment is for a felony.
5. When the court has misdirected the jury in a matter of
law, or has erred in the decision of any question of law arising
during the course of the trial.
I.C. § 19-2406(1) and (5).
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Neither of these subsections apply to Fairchild's claim. Fairchild argues
his trial was held in his absence because the motion to amend hearing was not
held in his presence.

(Appellant's brief, p. 5.)

Fairchild does not offer any

evidence or law to support his argument that a motion hearing constitutes a
"trial." (See Appellant's brief, pp. 5-7.) Fairchild failed to show his claim falls
under subsection (1 ).
Nor does Fairchild's claim fall under subsection (5), which states that a
defendant is entitled to a new trial, "[w]hen the court ... has erred in the decision
of any question of law arising during the course of the trial." I.C. § 19-2406(5).
Fairchild argues that the district court erred in a question of law because the
district court held the motion to amend hearing in chambers. (Appellant's brief,
pp. 6-8.) However, the district court was never asked to make a ruling whether
the hearing should be held in chambers. (See 4/9/13 Tr., p. 75, L. 8 - p. 82, L.
17 .) There can be no error in the decision of any question of law, such that
would be grounds for granting a new trial under Idaho Code§ 19-2406(5), where
the district court was not asked to make a ruling. See State v. Christiansen, 144
Idaho 463, 470, 163 P.3d 1175, 1182 (2007) (if there was no objection there
were no grounds for granting a new trial under I.C. § 19-2406(5)). Fairchild's trial
counsel did not object to holding the motion hearing in chambers. (See 4/9/13
Tr., p. 75, L. 8 - p. 82, L. 17.) The district court was never asked a question of
law regarding the location of the motion hearing, and thus the district court could
not have erred in ruling on a "question of law" and Fairchild's claim does not fall
under subsection (5).
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However, even if Fairchild's claim falls under Idaho Code § 19-2406,
Fairchild failed to show the district court abused its discretion because his rights
were not violated.

Fairchild's claim that his right to a public trial was violated

because a motion hearing was held in chambers is without support. Fairchild
failed to cite any case or authority that extends his public trial right to a motion to
amend hearing. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 6-7.) There is no requirement that a
district court hold a hearing on a motion to amend.

See I.C.R. 7(e).

District

courts can, and do, rule on written motions without ever holding a hearing.
Instead, Fairchild cites to Waller, an United States Supreme Court
decision, in which the Court extended the right of a public trial to a suppression
hearing.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 6-7 (citing Waller v. Georgia, 47 U.S. 39, 46

(1984).) The rationale used by the Waller Court to extend the right of a public
trial to an evidentiary suppression hearing does not apply to the motion to amend
hearing held in Fairchild's case. Waller reasoned:
In addition to ensuring that judge and prosecutor carry out their
duties responsibly, a public trial encourages witnesses to come
forward and discourages perjury.
These aims and interests are no less pressing in a hearing to
suppress wrongfully seized evidence. As several of the individual
opinions in Gannett recognized, suppression hearings often are as
important as the trial itself.

In addition, a suppression hearing often resembles a bench trial:
witnesses are sworn and testify, and of course counsel argue their
positions. The outcome frequently depends on a resolution of
factual matters. The need for an open proceeding may be
particularly strong with respect to suppression hearings. A
challenge to the seizure of evidence frequently attacks the conduct
of police and prosecutor. As the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has noted, "[s]trong pressures are naturally at work on the
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prosecution's witnesses to justify the propriety of their conduct in
obtaining" the evidence. The public in general also has a strong
interest in exposing substantial allegations of police misconduct to
the salutary effects of public scrutiny. In sum, we hold that under
the Sixth Amendment any closure of a suppression hearing over
the objections of the accused must meet the tests set out in PressEnterprise and its predecessors.
Waller, 467 U.S. at 46-47 (internal citations omitted). In contrast, the motion to
amend hearing held in chambers did not involve risk of perjury because there
was no testimony or the taking of any evidence. (4/9/13 Tr., p. 75, L. 8 - p. 82,
L. 17.) Nor was there any allegations of police misconduct. (Id.) Instead, the

district court ruled on a motion to amend, where Fairchild had been aware of the
proposed amendment months prior to the hearing.

(Id.)

Fairchild does not

provide any case law where a purely legal motion hearing, where both counsel
are present, constitutes a "trial" where his right to a public trial would be
implicated.
Nor was Fairchild's due process right to be personally present violated
when the district court held the motion hearing in chambers.

While the

defendant has a right to be present at all proceedings, this right is not an
absolute right.

State v. Dunlap. 155 Idaho 345, 368, 343 P. 3d 1, 24 (2013)

(citing Kentucky v. Stincer. 482 U.S. 730, 747(1987)). The right to be present
guarantees "a defendant 'the right to be present at any stage of the criminal
proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the
fairness of the procedure."

~

(citing Stincer, 482 U.S. at 747). To establish that

this right has been violated the defendant is required to present evidence that his
presence could have affected the outcome of the hearing.
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~

In Dunlap. the

Idaho Supreme Court held there was no due process violation where Dunlap
was unable to show how his presence would have changed the hearing.
While Dunlap was not present on either occasion, Dunlap has not
shown how his presence could have affected the outcome of either
hearing. The district court included counsel in both meetings, and
in the more substantive meeting regarding the phone call, the
contents of the meeting were placed on the record to protect
Dunlap's right to meaningful appellate review. Neither meeting
appears to be the kind where Dunlap's assistance could have
ensured fairer or more reliable proceedings because he did not
possess any information related to the claims. Therefore, we
conclude that Dunlap has failed to demonstrate error.
Id. In Stincer, the United States Supreme Court held that the defendant's due
process right to be present was not violated by his absence from a competency
hearing of a minor witness, because the defendant did not give any indication
that his presence would have been useful in the hearing. Jg_. (citing Stincer, 482
U.S. at 747.) The United States Supreme Court explained "there is no indication
that the defendant "could have done anything had he been at the hearing nor
would he have gained anything by attending." Stincer, 482 U.S. at 747 (1987)
(citation and brackets omitted). The same is true here. The district court found
that Fairchild's presence would not have impacted the motion to amend.
The amendment would have been made either with or
without the defendant being present. Nor would the defendant
have been able to testify at the time of the hearing on the
amendment because it is an issue of law.
(9/10/13 Tr., p. 26, Ls. 14-17.) Fairchild's right to be present was not violated.
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied his motion for a new
trial.
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CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's
decision denying Fairchild's motion for a new trial.
DATED this 15th day of January, 2015.

Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 15th day of January, 2015, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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